Verifying temporal speci cations of reactive and concurrent systems commonly relies on generating auxiliary assertions and on strengthening given properties of the system. This can be achieved by two dual approaches: The bottom-up method performs an abstract forward propagation (computation) of the system, generating auxiliary assertions; the top-down method performs an abstract backward propagation to strengthen given properties. Exact application of these methods is complete but is usually infeasible for large-scale veri cation. Approximation techniques are often needed to complete the veri cation.
Introduction
The deductive veri cation of temporal speci cations of reactive and concurrent systems commonly relies upon nding suitable auxiliary assertions and strengthened properties MP95]. This paper describes a general framework for generating invariants and intermediate assertions that can help in the veri cation of general temporal safety properties. General temporal safety formulas can express properties such as invariance, rst-in-rst-out ordering, causality, and bounded overtaking.
Deductive methods provide a veri cation rule that proves invariance properties by establishing rst-order premises. These premises often require an auxiliary invariant which strengthens the invariance property being proved. There are two ways to nd the strengthed invariant: forward propagation (bottom-up method) is a symbolic forward execution of the system S yielding an invariant that characterizes the set of reachable states; backward propagation (top-down method) is a symbolic backward execution of S from the states satisfying the invariance property being proved, yielding an invariant that characterizes the states that maintain the invariance property. We will see that both methods, in principle, generate adequate auxiliary invariants. Early work on forward and backward propagation in sequential program verication includes GW75, KM76] . More recently MP95,BLS96] have extended the methodologies to concurrent systems. This paper extends traditional methodologies for invariance properties by formulating a new inference rule and analyzing it to obtain new methods for general safety formulas. Our main tool is the use of assertion graphs that summarize the models of safety formulas. The exposition demonstrates a tight connection between the veri cation rule and the duality of backward and forward propagation.
Exact forward or backward propagation of a system S may not terminate when the state space of S is in nite or unmanageably large. This motivates the study of approximate, but terminating, propagation methods over different domains. General safety formulas were rst treated in BBM95] where techniques from linear algebra, linear programming and monadic second-order logic were applied in several case studies of approximate propagation. Linear algebra has long been applied to the automatic discovery of linear equalities between system variables Lau73, Kar76] . Linear programming was proposed in CH78] to express linear constraints among system variables in the form of convex polyhedra. It is also one of the most prominent examples of the abstract interpretation theory introduced in CC77]. Real-time systems can be analyzed using successive over-and under-approximations of propagation with convex polyhedra DW95]. Monadic second-order logic applied in set-based program analysis Hei92] provides unary constraints on the values of program variables. The case studies used in this paper overview some of these techniques while extending them to handle parameterized systems. In particular, we show how polyhedral analysis can be extended both with respect to parameterization and general safety properties. The use of approximation domains appeals in general naturally to techniques developed in constraint programming.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes preliminary notions such as the computational model of reactive systems, linear-time temporal logic and xedpoints. In Section 3 we present the veri cation rule and introduce bottom-up and top-down methods for invariance properties. The methods are extended to handle general safety properties in Section 4. Section 5 introduces approximation techniques to support the exact methods presented in Sections 3 and 4. In the same section, approximation is used to establish invariance and general safety properties for examples where exact propagation would fail. Some of the methods described in this paper are included in a released version of the veri cation system STeP, the Stanford Temporal Prover BBC + 95]. STeP veri es linear-time temporal logic speci cations of reactive and concurrent systems, combining algorithmic and deductive techniques.
Preliminaries 2.1 Transition Systems
Following MP95], our computational model for reactive systems is that of a transition system, S = hV; ; T i, where V is a nite set of system variables, is the initial condition, and T is a nite set of transitions. Fairness assumptions are ignored when establishing safety properties, so the usual sets of just and compassionate transitions are omitted. The vocabulary V contains data variables, control variables and auxiliary variables. The set of states (interpretations) over V is denoted by . We assume a rst-order assertion language A over V. The initial condition is an assertion in this language. A transition maps each state s 2 into a (possibly empty) set of -successor states, (s) . The mapping associated with is de ned by an assertion (x; x 0 ), called the transition relation, which relates the values x of the variables in state s and the values x 0 in a successor state s 0 2 (s). We require that T contains a transition I , called the idling transition, such that (s) = fsg for every state s.
A computation of a system S is an in nite sequence of states s 0 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; : : :, such that s 0 is an initial state satisfying and for every i 0 there is a transition 2 T satisfying s i+1 2 (s i ).
To facilitate the representation of systems, some of our examples are given in SPL (Simple Programming Language), which is used to represent concurrent programs in MP95,BBC + 95]. SPL statements are translated into transitions in a straightforward manner. For example, the assignment statement 0 : x := y + 1;`1 : assigns y + 1 to x when control resides at location`0, and simultaneously moves control to`1. The transition corresponding to this statement has the transition relation (`0;`1; x; y;`0 0 ;`0 1 ; x 0 ; y 0 ) : at`0^x 0 = y + 1^y 0 = y^at`0 1^: at`0 0 :
Preconditions and Postconditions
The weakest precondition wp( ; ')(x) and strongest postcondition sp( ; ')(x) of an assertion '(x), relative to a transition , are de ned by
wp characterizes the states that must reach a '-state (i.e., a state satisfying ') by taking . sp characterizes the states reachable from a '-state by taking .
For example, transitions associated with guarded assignments of the form if c(x) then x := e(x) have transition relations of the form (x; x 0 ) : c(x)x 0 = e(x). Their weakest precondition, wp( ; ')(x) : 8x 0 :c(x)^x 0 = e(x) ! '(x 0 ), can be simpli ed to wp( ; ')(x) : c(x) ! '(e(x)).
The two operators are monotone in ' since all occurrences of ' are positive, i.e., they are under the scope of an even number of negations. Thus, ( 
The monotonicity of G ensures that X:G(X)] ] is the unique least xedpoint, i.e., the least set S such that S = G(X)] ] S=X] , and that X:G(X)] ] is the unique greatest xedpoint.
Searching for xedpoints in the assertion language A itself, we apply G repeatedly starting from F (false). If the ascending chain F; G(F); G (2) (F); : : : converges in a nite number of iterations, its limit is an assertion in A equivalent to X:G(X). Similarly, we can generate the descending chain T; G(T); G (2) (T); : : :, starting from T (true); if it converges an assertion in A is produced which is equivalent to X:G(X). In general, the generated sequences are not guaranteed to converge to the xedpoints in a nite number of steps.
Invariance
An assertion p is S-invariant (invariant for short) if S q 0 p. To establish that a given assertion p is S-invariant, we use the veri cation rule inv (Figure 1 ). This sound and relatively complete 1 proof rule reduces the veri cation of 0 p to rst-order premises. For a given transition system S and assertion p, to prove that 0 p is S-valid, we have to nd a strengthened assertion ' such that the rst-order premises I1?I3 are S-state-valid. In premise I3 we When establishing premises I1?I3 of rule inv it is sound to assert any previously established invariant as an axiom. This will be used throughout the paper.
The main di culty in using rule inv is nding the strengthened assertion '. We now show that the strongest and weakest candidates for ' can be given xedpoint characterizations. 
Forward propagation
? ? -
where the horizontal implications are given by the xedpoint equations. If one of the downwards directed implications is present, all the others must also be. As Figure 2 shows, the p-invariant states, given by ' B , are a subset of the p-states, which are those states where p holds but is not necessarily preserved by the transitions.
An example of forward and backward propagation
We analyze program bakery ( Figure 3 ) using both forward and backward propagation. The program guarantees mutual exclusion, that is,`3 and m 3 are never reached at the same time. Synchronization is provided by the integer variables y 1 and y 2 , which can be thought of as numbers used in waiting-lines at bakeries.
local y 1 ; y 2 : integer where y 1 = y 2 = 0 P 1 :: 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 loop forever do 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4`0 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 jj P 2 :: 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 loop forever do Continuing mechanically in this fashion we obtain the formulas shown in Fig one obtains the assertion labeling the source of the edge. The conjunction of the formulas is the greatest xedpoint ' B of B. The auxiliary invariants 0 (y 1 0) and 0 (y 2 0) were used to simplify the examined conjuncts. These invariants can be generated automatically using for instance approximate forward propagation in the closed convex polyhedra domain, which is described later in this paper. Finally, since : at`0^at m 0^y1 = y 2 = 0 implies ' B , we have indeed established mutual exclusion of the critical sections.
The example shows the power of backward propagation: a completely automatic search terminates with a strengthened invariant. The analysis described above is entirely automatic in STeP. Forward propagation, on the other hand, does not converge in nitely many steps because the program's set of states cannot be reached in nitely many iterations.
General Safety
A general safety formula p is one equivalent to a temporal formula of the form 0 q where q is a past formula, that is, a formula that does not contain any future temporal operators. The nested waiting-for formula
for assertions p, q 1 , q 2 and r is a general safety formula. A model satis es this formula if every p-position initiates a q 1 -interval, followed by a q 2 -interval, that may be terminated by an r-position. Each q i -interval, i = 1; 2, is a set of successive positions all of which satisfy q i , and may be empty or extend to in nity. In the latter case, there need not be a following interval nor a terminating r-position. This is a general safety formula, since it is equivalent to the formula G is an assertion graph for p if it describes exactly the models of p, i.e., for every model : s 0 ; s 1 ; : : :, h ; 0i q p i there exists a path n 0 (2N 0 ); n 1 ; : : : in G such that s i q (n i ) for every i 0.
Lemma 1 Given a general safety formula p, where temporal operators do not appear in the scope of quanti ers, an assertion graph for p is computable.
Proof (sketch)
To simplify the exposition we use the property that p is equivalent to a formula 0 ' such that ' is a past temporal formula in which the only boolean operators are : and^, the only temporal operators are B and and no temporal operator is in the scope of a quanti er.
Let cl('), the closure of ', be the set of all subformulas f of ' and their negations. Thus, for example, cl(p B q) = fp; q; :p; :q; p B q; :(p B q)g. Let G = hN;N 0 ; E; i be the assertion graph with the following components { N 2 cl(') where n 2 N i a) ' 2 n, b) for any f 2 cl('); f 2 n i :f 6 2 n, c) f 1^f2 2 n i f 1 2 n and f 2 2 n, d) if f 1 B f 2 2 n then f 1 2 n or f 2 2 n. { N 0 N where n 2 N 0 i f 6 2 n for every f 2 cl('). { (n 1 ; n 2 ) 2 E i a) for any f 2 cl('), f 2 n 2 i f 2 n 1 , b) for any f 1 Bf 2 2 cl('), f 1 Bf 2 2 n 2 i either f 2 2 n 2 or f 1 B f 2 2 n 1 . { (n) = V ff 2 n j f is rst-orderg.
It can be shown that G is an assertion graph for p.
The outline given above is a simple modi cation of the well-known tableau construction MP95]. One can also construct a tableau directly from the temporal formula without going into past-normal form. The construction requires us to consider more special cases, but guarantess that the assertion graph is of size 2 O(jpj) .
Example(assertion graph) For program bakery in Figure 3 , the 1-bounded overtaking property for process P 1 is expressed by the general safety formula p bound :
That is, whenever process P 1 reaches`2, process P 2 can access its critical region at most once before P 1 reaches its critical region at`3.
An assertion graph G for p bound is shown in Figure 6 . Statechart conventions Har84] are used for a more compact graphical representation. For example, the edge departing the compound node containing n 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 to n 4 represents the edges (n 1 ; n 4 ); (n 2 ; n 4 ); (n 3 ; n 4 ). The arrows without sources indicate initial nodes, thus, N 0 = fn 0 ; n 1 ; n 2 g. The label at`2 in the compound node distributes as a conjunct to the encapsulated nodes n 1 ; n 2 and n 3 . For a node n 2 N, we say that a state s is (S; n)-accessible if there exists a nite computation s 0 ; s 1 ; : : :; s k , of S, where s = s k , and a nite path n 0 ; n 1 ; : : :; n k in G such that n 0 2 N 0 , n = n k , and for 0 i k; s i q (n i ).
An assertion ' is (S; n)-valid if it holds for every (S; n)-accessible state.
For transition system S = hV; ; T i, general safety formula p, assertion graph G = hN;N 0 ; E; i for p, and assertions f' n g n2N The veri cation rule safe shown in Figure 7 reduces the veri cation of the general safety formula p to rst-order premises S1?S3. Suppose By premise S1, 9n2N 0 s 0 q ' n : Thus, by induction on i, it follows that 8i 0 9n 2 N s i q ' n : Hence, by S2, induces a path n 0 (2N 0 ); n 1 ; : : : on G such that s i q (n i ) for every i 0. Therefore is a model of p.
Lemma 3 Rule safe is relatively complete for general safety formulas where temporal operators are not in the scope of quanti ers.
Proof (sketch) Let p be an S-valid general safety property with no temporal operators in the scope of a quanti er. By Lemma 1, there exists an assertion graph G for p. Assuming p is S-valid we must establish that there are assertions f' n g n2N satisfying premises S1?S3. By encoding nite sequences and corresponding operations in the assertion language A (assumed to be sufciently expressive), it is possible to construct a formula acc(S; n) for each n 2 N, such that: s q acc(S; n) i s is (S; n)-accessible :
The assertions facc(S;n)g n2N trivially satisfy the premises of safe.
Finding useful strengthened assertions f' n g n2N for rule safe is the main obstacle in its use; assertions facc(S;n)g n2N seldomly provide useful information for an automatic veri er. Similar to the analysis of inv we now give xedpoint characterizations of the strongest and weakest intermedate assertion candidates for safe.
Notation: For an ordered set N we will denote a tuple, indexed by the elements in N, by (a n ) n2N or a N .
Forward Propagation
In general, rule safe, unlike rule inv, does not have a unique least set of intermediate assertions. Therefore we cannot hope to nd, as we did in the invariance case, a forward operator whose least xpoint gives the best possible intermediate assertions. The following is an example of an assertion graph that has two incomparable minimal (with respect to the order on A jNj de ned pointwise by the implication relation) tuples of assertions satisfying S1?S3.
Example (two minimal solutions for S1?S3) Consider a graph with two nodes, N = N 0 = fn 1 ; n 2 g, labeled (n 1 ) : x = 0 and (n 2 ) : y = 0, in which any two nodes are connected. This graph is an assertion graph for the property 0 (x = 0 _ y = 0). Consider the transition system with : x = 0^y = 0 and only one transition, I , the idling transition, de ned by : x 0 = x^y 0 = y. In this system there are two minimal solutions to S1?S3, namely ( ' n 1 : x = 0^y = 0 ' n 2 : F ( ' n 1 : F ' n 2 : x = 0^y = 0 :
However, there is a subclass of graphs for which rule safe has a unique least set of intermediate assertions. This is the class of deterministic graphs. We say that an assertion graph G is deterministic if any model has at most one path in G starting in N 0 , that is, for any n 1 ; n 2 that are di erent, if n 1 ; n 2 2 N 0 or for some m 2 N; (m; n 1 ); (m; n 2 ) 2 E then (n 1 )^ (n 2 ) is unsatis able. Notice that in the above example G is not deterministic as n 1 ; n 2 2 N 0 and (n 1 )^ (n 2 ), which is x = 0^y = 0, is satis able.
We could restrict ourselves to deterministic graphs and still obtain a complete rule. But this is not necessary because we will show that we can deal with the general case by nding intermediate assertions for a stronger rule, strong-safe, shown in Figure 8 , that admits a unique least set of intermediate assertions for any graph G.
For transition system S = hV; ; T i, general safety formula p, assertion graph G = hN;N 0 ; E; i for p, and assertions f' n g n2N S1a Premises S1a and S1b strengthen premise S1 in safe, similarly S3a and S3b strengthen premise S3. 2. Consider a deterministic assertion graph G. Then S1 and S2 imply S1b, and also S1 and S2 imply S1a since ^ (n) ! |{z} by S1
(n)^(
S3 implies S3a since for (n; m) 2 E: Corollary The connection between the rule strong-safe and ' F;N is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 7 There exists a set of assertions satisfying the premises of rule strong-safe i S1b holds and ' F;N satis es S3b. Thus, ' F;N precisely characterizes the (S; n)-accesible states.
Proof ( Notice that S2 is always satis ed by ' F;N , since ' F;n $ F n (' F;N ) and F n (' F;N ) ! (n) for n 2 N. ' F;N is the least tuple ' F;N satisfying F n (' F;N ) ! ' F;n 8n 2 N:
As we observed, this implies that ' F;N satis es S1a and S3a. Corollary 8 There exists a set of assertions satisfying the premises of rule safe if S1b holds and ' F;N satis es S3b.
Extended Assertion Graphs
In order to show that a xedpoint of the forward propagation operator is a good set of intermediate assertions we have to check that it satis es condition S3b. If an iterative propagation method is used to nd the xedpoint, rather than checking S3b after the xedpoint has been reached, we can perform the check after each iteration. Checking S3b at each iteration can save time and in case of failure help produce a counterexample. For a graphical interpretation of this method, we de ne the (edge-complete) extension G e of G which is a supergraph of G with the property that any sequence whose rst state satis es W n2N e 0 (n) has at least one path in G e .
Suppose that n f and fn e g n2N are new distinct symbols not in N. Let E e = E f(n;n e ); (n e ; n f ) j n 2 Ng e (n f ) = T :
The n e nodes can be considered as escape nodes for those computations that after reaching n have nowhere to go in G. All the computations that fail to stay in G end looping in the node n f . Notice that if G is deterministic, using G e we can characterize the models of both p and :p. A model satis es p i its (unique) path in G e stays in N and conversely, it satis es :p i its rst state does not satisfy W n2N 0 (n) or its path in G e reaches a node in N e n N. Example (G and G e ) Consider program prod-cons (Figure 9 ), a simple version of a producer-consumer protocol. The statement produce x assigns some nonzero value to x and consume z sets z to 0. They do not change other variables. Statements request and release stand for the standard semaphores P and V . The causality property that a given value u is not consumed unless it was rst produced can be expressed in temporal logic as p caus : 0 z = u ! Q x = u] :
The nodes in N e n N in the assertion graph depicted in Figure 10 are drawn with two concentric ovals. With this de nition, condition S3b can be replaced by the condition that ' F;n is unsatis able for any n 2 N e n N. If the sequence (F) n2N e; F N e((F) n2N e); F (2) N e ((F) n2N e); : : : converges in nitely many steps to ' F;N e, then p is S-valid i S1b holds and for any n 2 N e n N, ' F;n is unsatis able.
Thus the bottom-up approach to verifying p consists of the following steps: check that S1b holds, generate the least xedpoint, ' F;N e, of F N e and check (at every step) that 8n 2 N e nN, ' F;n is unsatis able. Notice that, unlike the invariance case, forward propagation for general safety formulas depends on the given property. (Figure 9 ), the temporal formula p caus , and its assertion graph and extension in Figure 10 .
The rst three steps of the propagation sequence associated with G e and program prod-cons are shown in Figure 11 . Each new disjunct is underlined and its source is speci ed. For instance, disjunct d 21 is obtained in the rst iteration from the initial condition . Notice that we do not have to compute ' F;n 2 and ' F;n 3 . Since N e n N is not reachable from these nodes it is not important what the actual formulas are. (We could take ' F;n 2 : x = u and ' F;n 3 : T together with the other formulas to satisfy conditions S1?S3).
The bottom-up method for proving a general safety formula p can also be used for debugging. With an assertion graph G and its extension G e for p we generate assertions ' N e, expressing the (S; n)-accessible states, in stages.
Stage i + 1 is obtained from stage i by applying F N e. The propagation stops when we obtain a satis able ' n;i for n 2 N e n N and i 0. By recording the history of previous iterations we can reconstruct the symbolic computation that ends outside G.
Example (counterexamples using forward propagation) Consider again program prod-cons (Figure 9 ). Suppose we want the protocol to have a lazy production property, namely that once the producer writes a value into x it will wait until that value is read by the consumer before assigning a new value to x. This property is expressed by the formula p ord : 0 x = u ! ((x = u^z 6 = u) W (x = u^z = u)) W x 6 = u] where u is an auxiliary integer variable used to record the value of x. Figure 12 shows the graph G of all models of p ord , and its extension G e . 12 . Graphs G and G e for the formula p ord Table 1 shows the disjuncts produced in the rst six applications of the forward propagation operator F N and maintains enough information to construct an abstract counterexample. Besides the conjunctions listed, each row contains the conjunct z = 0. We stopped when we obtained a satis able disjunct for a node in N e nN. A counterexample s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s 6 ; s 6 ; : : : is generated by tracing back the origins of the rst disjunct of ' n e 1 :
in node n 0 : s 1 q at`0^at m 0^0 = x 6 = u^y = 0^z = 0^e = 1^f = 0 in node n 1 : s 2 q at`1^at m 0^0 6 = x = u^y = 0^z = 0^e = 1^f = 0 in node n 1 : s 3 q at`2^at m 0^0 6 = x = u^y = 0^z = 0^e = 0^f = 0 in node n 1 : s 4 q at`3^at m 0^0 6 = x = u^y = u^z = 0^e = 0^f = 0 in node n 1 : s 5 q at`0^at m 0^0 6 = x = u^y = u^z = 0^e = 0^f = 1 in node n e 1 : s 6 q at`1^at m 0^0 6 = x 6 = u^y = u^z = 0^e = 0^f = 1 ' n e 2 Table 1 Six iterations of forward propagation for prod-cons and p ord . The counterexample shows that it is possible that Prod produces a new value before Cons has had a chance to read the previous one. A x to this problem is to switch statements`0 and`1.
Backward Propagation
The situation is simpler for backward propagation, where a largest solution to An assertion graph G for p bound is shown in Figure 6 . Forward propagation does not terminate, but the property can be proved using backward propagation.
To compute the limit of the sequence (T) n2N ; B N ((T) n2N ); B (2) N ((T) n2N ); : : :
we assume the invariant 0 (at`2 ! y 1 1).
This invariant can be generated by several known approximation methods BBM95].
One iteration of B generates ' n = (n) for each n 2 N. In the second iteration we get The other ''s remain at their previous values. A third application of B shows that a xedpoint was reached. Since implies ' n 0 and n 0 2 N 0 , premise S1
holds. Backward propagation has thus provided ' n 0 : :at`2; ' n 1 : :at m 3^a t`2;
' n 2 : at m 3^a t`2; ' n 3 : :at m 3^a t`2^(at m 2 ! y 2 y 1 ); ' n 4 : at`3 which are the necessary intermediate assertions to establish the 1-bounded overtaking property.
Approximate Analysis
As we have seen, there is no guarantee for success in forward and backward analysis. For in nite or even large nite-state systems, the propagation may not terminate or, even if the sequences converge in a nite number of iterations, we may not be able to prove it (we might not be able to prove for instance that F n+1 (F) ! F n (F) 
and therefore premises (I1) and (I3) of rule inv are satis ed. The implication in the conclusion is based on two implications:
! |{z} by monotonicity of 
Finitary propagation -invariance
We now study an example where forward propagation is performed on a nite propositional subset of the assertion language. This gives a nite abstraction domain D, where the relation can be reduced to a propositional decision problem. The operator sp D will however be de ned in terms of sp, and this will require a restriction of rst-order reasoning.
The parameterized program shown in Figure 13 implements a simple protocol for ordering access to location`3 among N processes. It uses two arrays j and a originally initialized to respectively 1 and F. Each process P n] starts at location`0 and resides in the while-loop, until every process P m] with lower index has set a m] to T. The invariance property implies that two di erent processes do not reside simultaneously at the critical location`3. The precedence property implies that processes with lower indices get priority entering the location`3.
Forward and backward propagation directly on the assertion language A is inadequate to handle parameterized transition systems. The unbounded number of processes necessitates introduction of quanti ers over the range 1::N].
Since each propagation step only considers the advance of one process, a potentially unbounded number of propagation steps are necessary to cover the search space.
One way to analyze the program in a nitary way is to restrict the assertion language over which program states can be described. In a way speci cally tailored for the example, we restrict atomic propositions to be in one of the following forms:
a m] a n] j m] < n j m] = n m < n m n`0 m]::`4 m] :
An assertion ' in this restricted language D is a boolean combination of these atomic propositions. An assertion in A is obtained projecting ' 2 D to (') = 8n;m : 1::N]:' in A. As t we take disjunction _, which satis es (')_ ( ) ! In CP93] unskolemization is applied to generate rst-order intermediary assertions for proving partial correctness of ow-chart programs. Their approach resembles forward propagation by breadth-rst search through candidate invariance properties. The candidates are generated using unskolemization as a weakening heuristic to obtain appropriate logical consequences.
The precedence property P is treated in Section 5.7. Another representation of P is given by a system of generators: a nite set ofx 6 y P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P y 60
x 70 x + 3y 190 (a) Constraint representation -x 6 y s s P P P P P P P P v 0 v 1 -P P P q r 1 r 2 (b) Generator representation The domain of closed convex polyhedra (with rational coe cients) is an abstraction of the assertion language A with the concretization function given by the inclusion : 7 ! A. The partial order, minimal and maximal elements are the subset relation, the empty set, and the total set which are mapped by into the implication relation, F and T respectively.
An approximation of F in is F(') 4 = t sp (T ; '); where : t is the convex hull operator: P 1 t P 2 is the smallest closed convex polyhedron that includes P 1 and P 2 . The convex hull can be computed using the generator representations: if (R 1 ; V 1 ) and (R 2 ; V 2 ) are the generator representations for P 1 and P 2 then (R 1 R 2 ; V 1 V 2 ) is a generator representation for P 1 t P 2 . sp (T ; ') 4 = F sp ( ; '), where sp ( ; ')(V )
Notice that 9x is an operator on . Indeed, it can be shown that 9x:P = P t ( V y6 =x (y = 0)).
' 2 is such that ' ! ' . For a given ' we can compute such an ' by rst rewriting ' = c 1^: : :^c k and then taking ' 4 = V fc i j c i is linearg.
The sequence P 0 : F; P 1 : F(P 0 ); P 2 : F(P 1 ); : : : does not necessarily converge in nitely many steps (it actually might not even converge in ). However it is possible to achieve convergence using a widening operator CH78]. This is an operator 5 : 7 ! such that (W1) for any P 1 ; P 2 2 ; P 1 t P 2 ! P 1 5 P 2 , (W2) for any P 0 ! P 1 ! : : : in , the sequence P 0 0 ; P 0 1 ; : : : de ned by P 0 0 = P 0 and P 0 i+1 = P 0 i 5 P i+1 converges in a nite number of steps.
Several widening operators appear in the literature. The simplest is de ned by P 1 5 P 2 4 = 8 > < > :
P 2 if P 1 = F; the polyhedron de ned by the constraints of P 1 satis ed by P 2 otherwise
The widening operator can be used to obtain the sequence P 0 0 : F; P 0 1 : P 0 0 5 F(P 0 0 ); P 0 2 : P 0 1 5 F(P 0 1 ); : : : :
which, by (W2), converges after nitely many iterations. The above sequence conservatively approximates P 0 ; P 1 ; : : : and therefore its limit is a solution of F(P) ! P.
Most widening operators have the property that the constraints of P 1 5 P 2 are a subset of the constraints of P 1 (if P 1 6 = F). Thus the constraints of the limit polyhedron are a subset of the constraints of the polyhedron to which the rst widening has been applied. For this reason, forward propagation with widening usually converges to a better solution if we start with a few iterations without widening. We will use this observation in our examples.
Example (generation of invariants) Consider program loop (Figure 16 ).
We will use it to illustrate how we can obtain the basical loop invariants using Any xedpoint of B N will therefore satisfy S2 and S3. The greatest xedpoint will furthermore have the best chances to satisfy S1. Analogously, for backward propagation we assume D equipped with a join operator t, which is stronger than disjunction, besides the stronger meet u. The systematic construction of F N gives a formal and automated argument for its validity. The assertion graph generated from the precedence property is given in Figure 18 .
? ? ?
? ? --X X X X X X X X X z The formula ' F^m 0 < n 0^:`3 m 0 ]^:`3 n 0 ] works here, and is generated in the same way as ' F was in Figure 14 . The rest of ' F;N is extracted directly 3 The equation for F n 6 does not follow the general guidelines for construction of F, but is obtained by optimization based upon the label in n 6 . from the de nition of F N . Checking the resulting ' F;N against S3b nally establishes the validity of the precedence property.
General Safety Analysis in the closed convex polyhedra domain
Let G be an assertion graph and G a strengthened graph labeled by : N 7 ! A such that (n) ! (n) :
In the exact analysis we have used extension graphs to stop the propagation as soon as we have found a computation that cannot be contained in the assertion graph. It is possible to use this method in the approximate analysis as well, however (n e ) = :( W (n e ;m)2E (m)) has to be replaced by the weaker condition :( W (n;m)2E (m)) ! (n e ). This condition ensures that if P N e are a solution of the forward propagation operator on G e and all the polyhedra corresponding to nodes in G e ? G are empty then the systems satis es the speci cation.
In the analysis of non-parameterized systems we can de ne an approximation of F N e in as in Section 5.6. For parameterized transitions, we will present later in this section one possible de nition of sp n ( ; P) and of the concretization function such that sp n ( ; (P)) ! (sp n ( ; P)). Under these conditions, F N e has all the desired properties, except that the ascend- does not necessarily converge. We could use again a widening operator to speed up the convergence process. However, the widening operator of Section 5.4 does not guarantee that a solution ' N e has the property that 8n 2 N e ' n ! (n).
This motivates the following de nition:
A bounded widening operator is an operator 5 : (' 1 ; ' 2 ; ) 7 ! ' 1 5 ' 2 , where (W1 0 ) for any P 1 ; P 2 ; P 2 ; P 1 t P 2 ! P 1 P 5 P 2 (W2 0 ) for any P 0 ! P 1 ! : : : in and P 2 , the sequence P 0 0 ; P 0 1 ; : : : de ned by P 0 0 = P 0 and P 0 i+1 = P 0 i P 5 P i+1 converges in nitely many steps. (W3) for any P 1 ; P 2 ; P 2 , if P 1 ! P and P 2 ! P then P 1 P 5 P 2 ! P.
An example of such a bounded operator is P 1 P 5 P 2 = 8 > > > < > > > : P 2 if P 1 = F the polyhedron de ned by the constraints of P 1 satis ed by P 2 and the constraints of P satis ed by P 1 ; P 2 otherwise For a forward operator bounded by P the bounded widening operator can be used to obtain converging sequences bounded by P. For any n 2 N e , the sequence P 0 n;0 : F; P 0 n;1 : P 0 n;0 (n) 5 F n (P 0 N;0 ); : : :
converges in nitely many steps to a limit that is bounded by (n).
Example The program mux-ast presented in Figure 19 implements mutual exclusion by add-and-store instructions. The M processes coordinate their entry to the critical sections using the shared variable y. Each process has a local variable t. A non-negative value for t signals that the process can enter its critical section.
in M : integer where M > 0 local y : integer where y = 1 jj M i=1 P i] :: 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 local t : integer 0 : : loop forever do 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4`1 : noncritical 2 : t := ?1 3 : while t < 0 do 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 4`4 : await y > 0 5 : (t; y) := (y ? 1; y ? 1) 6 : if t = 0 theǹ 7 : critical 8 : y := y + 1 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 The property we want to verify is that if process k reaches`6 and no other process is at`6,`7 or`8 then no other process will access its critical region before process k. For this we will introduce the auxiliary variables N i for i 2 f6;7;8g that will count how many processes are at location`i. An augmented This property cannot be proven using forward propagation in by itself. However, it is possible to prove it by combining forward propagation in with other invariant generation methods. An established invariant 0 can be used in the approximate analysis to strengthen the labelings of all the nodes in the assertion graph or an extended supergraph of the assertion graph. The invariant used in this example is An assertion graph G rst for this property is shown in Figure 20 . For ease of presentation, we have omitted some of the unreachable nodes. For instance we have eliminated the nodes that contained the conjunct`5 k]^`6 k]. We have also omitted the nodes generated from node n 0 as no node in G e rst ? G rst is reachable from it.
A node of an assertion graph for ' can be split into a cluster of nodes each corresponding to a disjunct of its labeling. The resulting graph is also an assertion graph for '. Such a splitting results in a tighter approximation in the polyhedra domain and is therefore done whenever possible. Another method used in this example to obtain a better polyhedral approximation is to rewrite inequalities involving integer variables as a disjunction of weak inequalities. It can be shown that sp n (f j]g j ; (P i])) ! (sp n (f j]g j ; P i])) and therefore this will de ne a good approximation of the forward propagation operator.
Forward propagation for the nodes in Figure 21 results in the following polyhedra P s = ^ (n s ) for n s 2 fn 11 ; n 12 ; n 13 ; n 14 ; n 2 ; n 4 g P 3 = ^ ( The propagation on the nodes with m k+1 or i k+1 yields similar results. As all the polyhedra in G e rst ? G rst are empty we have mux-ast q p rst .
Conclusion
This paper presented a new inference rule, safe, for proving arbitrary general safety properties expressed in linear-time temporal logic. It generalizes the usual inference rule for proving invariance properties. The intermediate assertions needed for the application of the rule can be found in two dual ways: as least and greatest xedpoints respectively. As this is usually not possible, we applied and developed tools from abstract interpretation to nd approximations. In the case studies we developed new methodologies for abstract interpretation of parameterized programs.
The approach taken for the generation of invariants and intermediary assertions was to reduce a veri cation problem to domains that admit specialized and e cient constraint-solving methods. In prescribing general methodologies for such reductions we have not attempted to use special control features of the analyzed systems. Instead we outline how new automatic invariant generation and strengthening methods can be obtained by nding a suitable approximation domain, a suitable constraint language over this domain, and su ciently powerful constraint-solving procedures for this constraint language. A main challenge for further work is to identify useful domains that admit e cient constraint-solvers.
